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Revolving door

Pentagon 18 U.S.C. 207 waivers sit beside, not inside, OGE financial disclosure files

Public ethics statutes split post-government lobbying bans from annual wealth reports. Defense Department waiver files and Office of Government Ethics Form 278s are different records, reviewed on different clocks, and rarely published together.

The Times desk · September 26, 2026

Pentagon 18 U.S.C. 207 waivers sit beside, not inside, OGE financial disclosure files

Federal criminal law and civil ethics paperwork do not occupy the same folder. Title 18, United States Code, section 207 restricts certain former executive-branch officials from representing others before their old agencies. The statute is a criminal post-employment ban, not a wealth report. The Office of Government Ethics administers public financial disclosure under the Ethics in Government Act. Those two systems meet, if they meet at all, only when a former official’s new employer asks the Department of Defense for a written waiver of a communications ban that would otherwise apply.

Section 207(a) bars a former “senior” or “very senior” employee, for one or two years depending on rank, from communicating with or appearing before the employee’s former agency with intent to influence on behalf of another person. Subsection (c) adds a one-year cooling-off period for senior officials covering the entire department. Subsection (f) addresses foreign-entity representation. Congress authorized agency heads to waive some of those restrictions when the waiver is in the public interest and the former employee’s knowledge is uniquely needed. Defense Department implementing guidance, issued through the Standards of Conduct Office and component designated agency ethics officials, treats those waivers as case-by-case determinations, not as a public docket.

OGE Form 278 and 278-T, by contrast, are annual and termination reports of assets, income, liabilities, and positions. Filers above a pay threshold, including many political appointees and senior executives, file with their agency ethics office; OGE retains copies and posts some on its public website after review. The forms do not list section 207 waivers. They do not identify whether a former official later sought permission to contact the Pentagon on a contract, a program, or a legislative matter. A reader of a posted 278 therefore cannot see, from that document alone, whether the same person later obtained a 207 waiver.

The record that is public is fragmented. Inspector General and Government Accountability Office reports over two decades have described revolving-door risk in acquisition and program offices. Those reports cite the statute, OGE regulations at 5 C.F.R. Part 2641, and DOD Directive 5500.07-R. They do not typically append individual waiver letters. Congressional committees have, at intervals, asked the department how many 207 waivers were granted in a given year. Answers, when given in unclassified correspondence, have been counts or categories rather than names and contract numbers. OGE’s public database of 278s remains a separate feed.

Procurement ethics rules add a third layer. Federal Acquisition Regulation 3.104 and related procurement-integrity provisions restrict certain former officials from accepting compensation from a contractor on a particular procurement. Those restrictions are not identical to 18 U.S.C. 207. A former program executive officer might be clear of a compensation ban yet still need a 207 waiver to pick up the phone to the same program office on behalf of a new employer. Financial disclosure would show stock or a new salary if the filer remained in a covered position long enough to report it. It would not show the waiver.

Officials at OGE have described, in published guidance and annual reports to Congress, the agency’s role as reviewing disclosures, issuing certificates of divestiture, and interpreting the criminal conflict statute, 18 U.S.C. 208, which is a different section from 207. OGE does not grant DOD 207 waivers. The department’s designated agency ethics officials do, subject to the statute’s public-interest finding. That finding is not required to be posted next to the former official’s last 278.

The practical effect, according to ethics practitioners who comment in bar association materials and in testimony that is already on the congressional record, is that journalists and vendors reconstruct the path from personnel announcements, lobbying registrations under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and contractor bios. LDA filings name clients and issues. They do not certify that a 207 waiver was or was not issued. A former deputy assistant secretary who joins a prime contractor may appear in both an LDA report and an old 278; the waiver, if it exists, remains an internal ethics-office memorandum unless a committee or a FOIA requester later forces a release with redactions.

FOIA practice on this point is uneven. Exemption 6 privacy and Exemption 5 deliberative-process claims have been asserted over waiver files. Courts have not produced a uniform rule that every 207 waiver must be posted with the related 278. The result is that the two documents the public can most easily find—posted financial disclosures and lobbying registrations—do not contain the third document that actually lifts a criminal communications ban.

Budget justifications and IG semiannual reports show ethics-office staffing and training hours. They do not itemize waivers by program executive office or by major defense acquisition program. Capture risk, in the language of those audits, is discussed as a structural concern: officials leave for industry, industry hires people who know the requirements process, and the cooling-off clock is shorter than a program’s remaining years of production. The audits recommend tighter recusal language and better tracking. They do not claim that OGE 278s are a substitute for 207 waiver logs.

Living officials’ public positions, as stated in OGE annual reports and DOD ethics-program assessments, are that the department complies with the statute, that waivers are rare and documented, and that financial disclosure is a separate transparency tool aimed at conflicts of interest while in office, not at post-employment contacts. Those statements do not assert that the two files are cross-indexed for the public.

What the dockets already show is therefore a split architecture: criminal post-employment law with discretionary agency waivers on one side; civil financial disclosure on the other; procurement-integrity rules in a third statute; lobbying registration in a fourth. None of those systems, as published, routinely prints the waiver next to the last Form 278. Readers who want the full path must assemble personnel moves, LDA filings, contract awards, and whatever waiver documents later surface in oversight letters. The statutes do not require that assembly to be done by the government in a single public table.